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The U.S. Treasury estimates that personal income tax receipts in fiscal
1992 would be $51 billion higher without the special provisions accorded
employer-sponsored pension plans. Pension provisions, in fact, were the
single largest item in the tax expenditure budget. Like most other tax
expenditures, and unlike direct expenditures, the revenue loss from favorable
tax provisions for employer-sponsored plans is not submitted to a formal and
systematic review each year by Congress. Therefore, the question of whether
taxpayers are getting their money’s worth from this very large implicit outlay
should be addressed periodically.
To that end, this paper first takes a closer look at the tax expenditure
for employer-sponsored pensions--a number that has been the subject of
considerable controversy. After establishing that the forgone revenues are
substantial no matter how they are estimated, the following sections explore
whether the expenditures produce the desired results. Section II addresses
the saving issue and concludes that support for employer-sponsored pension
plans should not rest on the assumption that they increase national saving.
The last three sections assess the effectiveness of pensions as a
provider of supplementary retirement income. They discuss three serious
weaknesses with the current system. Section III focuses on the coverage
problem; only 46 percent of the private work force is currently covered and
coverage continues to decline. Section IV explores the erosion in the value
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Boston or the Federal Reserve System.of benefits experienced by mobile employees under defined benefit plans.
Section V addresses the lack of cost-of-living adjustments to annuity payments
to retired employees, under either defined benefit or defined contribution
plans.
The conclusion that emerges from this review is that despite a myriad of
legislative changes, all of which combine to increase the likelihood that
persons covered by pension plans will actually receive benefits, the U.S.
pension system is still a very erratic and unpredictable way to provide
retirement income and it benefits only a privileged subset of the population.
In short, the $51 billion is not well spent. If the government is going to
use taxpayers’ money to subsidize supplementary retirement income, it should
do so in a fashion whereby all citizens enjoy the subsidy. If this seems
unrealistic in the current environment, the alternative is to recoup the
subsidy. One way to accomplish this goal would be simply to levy an annual
tax of roughly 2.5 percent on the stock of pension assets; of course, numerous
other approaches are possible. The important message is that it is time to
explore the alternatives for revising the tax treatment of employer-sponsored
pension plans.
I. The Tax Expenditures for Employer-Sponsored Plans
Under current law, employees are not taxed currently on the value of
their annual accrued pension benefits; rather, they are .allowed to defer taxes
until benefits are received in retirement. This treatment is equivalent to an
interest-free loan from the Treasury and significantly reduces the lifetime
taxes of those employees who receive part of their compensation in wages andpart in pensions as opposed to those who receive all of their compensation in
cash wages.
In estimating the revenue loss from the favorable treatment of pensions,
the Treasury treats the absence of tax on the annual increment of accrued
pension benefits as equivalent to excluding from gross income the value of
employer contributions to pension plans and the annual earnings on accumulated
pension assets. This equivalence is not quite correct. In the old days, when
plans were significantly underfunded, contributions probably exceeded benefit
accruals since they generally included a payment to amortize unfunded
liabilities as well as to cover normal costs; in recent years, when many plans
have been more than adequately funded, contributions generally have been less
than the increase in accrued pension benefits. This difference is noted only
as a point of interest, however, since the thrust of this section is that
whatever concepts are used, the size of the forgone revenues is large.
The Treasury calculates the tax expenditure for pension plans on a cash-
flow bas~s, which is consistent with the expenditure side of the budget. The
two-step process involves first estimating the revenue that would be gained
from current taxation of pensions by applying the average marginal rate for
persons covered by pension plans to annual pension contributions and estimated
pension fund earnings. The second step requires subtracting from this revenue
gain the amount that would be lost from not taxing benefits in retirement, as
is done under the current law. This difference is reported as the revenue
loss in the Treasury’s tax expenditure accounts. The total figure reflects
the tax expenditure associated with private pensions, state and local plans,
and the civil service retirement system (Table I); no estimate appears to be
made for the military plan. Nevertheless, the exclusion of employer-sponsored
3pension plan contributions and earnings is the single largest tax expenditure,
topping even the revenue loss arising from the deduction of mortgage interest
on owner-occupied homes (Table 2).
Two lines of argument are sometimes employed to diminish the importance
of these estimated revenue losses. The first, which contends that the
treatment of pensions is consistent with that of saving under a consumption
tax, is accurate but of little relevance. True, the United States has
something of a hybrid System, but its commitment to the income tax was
reaffirmed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Treasury itself, with the
apparent concurrence of Congress, classifies the treatment of pensions as a
deviation from both the "normal" tax structure and the so-called "reference
law" baseline.
The second line of argument actually represents some confusion on the
part of critics. The notion is that the current calculation does not properly
take account of the fact that the large pension accruals not taxed today will
be taxed in the future. A generous interpretation of this concern is that the
cash-flow calculation may not be the best measure of the revenue loss.
Indeed, the cash-flow approach, which is meaningful for permanent
deductions and exclusions, does notproperly account for tax concessions in
those cases where tax payments are deferred. Its limitations for qualified
pension plans can be seen clearly by considering a situation in which (i)
annual contributions to private plans and pension fund earnings exactly equal
benefit payments during the year, and (2) workers face the same marginal tax
rate in retirement as they do during their working years. Under these
assumptions the revenue loss would equal zero, according to the Treasury
calculations of tax expenditures. Yet individuals covered by private plans
4Table I
Estimated Revenue Loss from Net Exclusion of Employer Pension Contributions
and Plan Earnings, Fiscal Years 1990-1992










Source: Estimated based on unpublished data from the Department of the
Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis.
Table 2
Top Ten Tax Expenditures in the Income Tax Ranked By Revenue Loss, Fiscal Year 1992
Item Billions
Net exclusion of employer plans pension contributions and earnings
Deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes
Exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums
and medical care
Step-up basis of capital gains at death
Accelerated depreciation
Deductibility of nonbusiness state and local taxes other than on
owner-occupied homes
Exclusion of OASI benefits for retired workers
Deductibility of charitable contributions
Exclusion of interest on public purpose state and local debt











Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budqet for Fiscal Year 1992,
1991, Section XI, "Tax Expenditures," Part Three, p. 40.would continue to enjoy the advantage of deferring taxes on employer
contributions and investment income until after retirement. Clearly, such tax
deferral reduces the present value of lifetime taxes for the individual and
produces a significant revenue loss for the Treasury.
A better estimate of the annual revenue loss resulting from deferral
would be the difference between (I) the present discounted value of the
revenue from current taxation of employer contributions and pension fund
earnings as they accrue over the employee’s working life, and (2) the present
discounted value of the taxes collected when the employer’s contributions and
investment returns are taxable to the employee after retirement. To estimate
the annual tax expenditure for employer-sponsored plans in this way requires
assumptions about the average age of covered workers, the typical retirement
age, life expectancy at retirement, the rate of earnings on pension reserves,
the appropriate discount rate, and marginal tax rates for workers and
retirees.
In the following calculations the typical retirement age is assumed to be
62 and the participants’ life expectancy upon retirement is assumed to be 18
years. For consistency with assumptions underlying the Treasury estimates,
contributions to employer-sponsored pension plans in fiscal 1992 are assumed
to be $143.5 billion, the effective tax rate for workers covered by a pension
plan is 23 percent, and the effective tax rate for pension plan beneficiaries
is 17.5 percent. Because of the sensitivity of the results to the other
assumptions, a number of estimates are calculated based on alternative values
for the average age of a covered worker and on differences between the rate of
return on pension reserves and the discount rate.This exercise reveals that deferring taxes on 1992 employer contributions
and on the earnings on those contributions until retirement, combined with a
significantly lower marginal tax rate in retirement, reduces tax revenues
between $40.0 billion and $68.9 billion in present value terms (Table 3). For
instance, if-the typical worker covered by a pension plan were 35, and if the
earnings on accumulated contributions were 7 percent and the discount rate 7
percent, then the tax expenditure calculated for fiscal 1992 contributions on
the present-value basis would be $51.4 billion. This compares to the Treasury
tax expenditure estimate calculated on a cash basis of $51.2 billion for
fiscal 1992.
It could be argued that the tax benefit for pension plan participants
should be limited to the value of deferral, and the rate effect that results
from the progressive tax structure ignored. Focusing solely on the revenue
loss from deferral, the present-value estimate of the tax expenditure becomes
$47.2 billion for the 35-year-old individual and an assumed interest rate of 7
percent. Thus, the revenue loss associated with the favorable treatment of
pension contribution~ and earnings is substantial regardless of how it is
measured.
Although this analysis provides some information with which to compare
alternative estimates of tax expenditures associated with employer-sponsored
pension plans, it is by no means intended to produce a precise estimate of
this expenditure. Rather, the exercise was designed to illustrate that the
debate over the precise magnitude of the tax expenditures is an unproductive
digression that diverts attention from the important topic of whether the
favorable tax treatment accorded contributions to private pension plans
represents an efficient and equitable use of scarce federal resources. TheTable 3
Alternative Estimates of Cost to Treasury of Favorable Tax Provisions for
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$56.5 $51.4 $45.9 $40.0
62.4 56.1 49.4 42.2
68.9 61.2 53.2 45.0
Estimate Bc
52.3 47.2 41.8 35.9
56.9 50.8 44.4 37.6
61.6 54.5 47.1 39.5
alncludes private pension plans, Federal Civilian Retirement System, and state
and local retirement systems.
bTax rate is 23 percent in working years and 17.5 percent during retirement.
CTax rate is 23 percent during working years and retirement.
Source: Author’s estimates.next sections explore the alleged benefits of employer-sponsored plans and
then highlight some of the major deficiencies.
II. The Saving Issue
Many people have espoused the expansion of employer-sponsored pensions
as a means of stimulating saving and capital formation, and have cited the
rapid increase in pension fund assets as evidence of pensions’ positive impact
on saving. Indeed, the growth in pension reserves has been extraordinary;
from the end of 1945 to the end of 1990, private pension assets rose from $5
billion to almost $2 trillion and state-local reserves from $3 billion to $0.8
trillion. Proponents of employer-sponsored plans imply that the buildup of
pension reserves represents a net increase in saving for the economy.
Economic theory suggests, however, that it may simply reflect a shift in the
form of saving. The life-cycle model predicts that, in an ideal world
characterized by perfect labor and capital markets, no taxes, and no
uncertainty, people would simply substitute the increase in their expected
pension benefits for their own saving.
Of course the U.S. economy deviates substantially from the model
described above, and these deviations introduce some ambiguity about the
probable effects of private pensions on saving. Favorable tax provisions,
imperfect capital markets, and induced retirement may cause pension plans to
increase saving. Uncertainty about the receipt and amount of benefits may
either increase or reduce saving, depending on whether people overestimate or
underestimate their future pension benefits. The fact that pensions are paid
as annuities and that private plans are less than fully funded should mean
that there is less aggregate saving than under the simple life-cycle model.
9Because of all these factors, the net effect of private pensions on personal
saving is indeterminate.
Since the issue cannot be determined theoretically, a final assessment
must rest on empirical evidence. If plans are fully funded--a reasonable
assumption these days--the key determinant of saving is the extent to which
individuals reduce their other saving in response to promised pension
benefits. The bulk of the evidence to date does provides some support for the
prediction of the simple life-cycle model that individuals reduce their own
saving in anticipation of benefits provided through public and private pension
plans. However, with one exception, none of the studies employed a very good
measure of anticipated pension benefits. Moreover, most of the studies
focused on the behavior of older men for whom retirement was the primary
saving motive; little progress has been made in terms of assessing the impact
of pensions on the saving of the entire popuTation. All that can reasonably
be said is that some offsetting behavior occurs and that it is less than
dollar for dollar.I
For illustrative purposes, however, assume a 65 to 70 cent offset for
each dollar of pension accrual--an estimate consistent with the results of
most of the accepted, albeit flawed, studies. This assumed offset implies, at
first glance, that if pension saving averaged $150 billion in the last few
years, individuals would have reduced their own saving by roughly $100
billion, producing a net increase in saving of $50 billion. From this amount,
however, must be subtracted the revenue loss created by the tax expenditure
for pension plans. Although considerable controversy surrounds these numbers
ISee Munnell and Yohn (1990) for a review of studies examining the impact
of pensions on saving.
10as indicated earlier, the Treasury figure for tax loss is around $50 billion
and very rough estimates based on present value calculations yield a similar
number. Given the large errors associated with both the saving and the tax
expenditure numbers, the most reasonable conclusion is that the increase in
private saving may well have been almost completely offset by a comparable
increase in the federal deficit.
Hence, the national saving issue is not a very important criterion for
supporting employer-sponsored pension plans. Rather, the question is whether
employer-sponsored plans are an equitable and effective mechanism for
providing retirement income. In this regard, the lack of universal coverage
and inadequate protection from inflation must be viewed as serious flaws.
III. The Coverage Problem
The goal of federal tax policy since 1942 has been to encourage, through
favorable tax provisions, the use ~f tax-qualified pension and profit-sharing
plans to ensure greater retirement security for all employees. Unfortunately,
the private pension system does not meet this desired objective. Among those
covered by pension plans, the benefits of the tax concessions go mainly to
average- and above-average-paid workers. In part this problem is inevitable,
since a progressive income tax makes it increasingly more advantageous for
individuals to defer taxes as their marginal income tax rates rise. In part,
it also reflects a history of integration provisions that allowed employers to
reduce earned pension benefits by a portion of the worker’s social security
benefit and thereby provide substantially greater benefits for higher-paid
employees. Recent reforms of the integration provision should help.
11The fundamental problem, however, is that not everyone is covered by a
private or government-sponsored supplementary pension plan. The most recent
survey, the May 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS), showed that only 39
percent of full-time private wage and salary workers aged 16 and over were
covered by a traditional defined benefit or defined contribution plan.
Another 7 percent were covered by employer-sponsored--although not necessarily
employer-financed--pre-tax plans, such as 401ks or 403bs. Although these pre-
tax plans sometimes provide annuities at retirement, they frequently allow
lump-sum payments before retirement; hence, their contribution as a source of
retirement income remains unclear. Nevertheless, even adding those with
salary reduction or pre-tax plans to those covered by basic retirement plans
brings the total to only 46 percent of full-time workers (Table 4).
Moreover, the percentage of the private work force covered by any type
of employer-sponsored retirement plan, after decades of expansion, declined in
the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of full-time workers covered
by any type of plan fell from 50 to 46 percent. Moreover, in view of the
enormous expansion of 401k-type plans, the decline in coverage under
traditional plans has probably been even more pronounced.2
When the decline in coverage was first revealed in a 1983 survey, many
attributed the development to the poor economic conditions and high
unemployment associated with the 1982 recession. Observers thought that
coverage losses were due solely to temporary layoffs and that coverage would
be expected to rebound with economic growth. In many older industries,
however, the proportion of employees working for firms that are large and
2Between May 1983 and May 1988, the availability of 401k arrangements
increased threefold; the proportion of nonagricultural wage and salary workers
offered 401k plans increased from 8 to 27 percent (EBRI 1989).
12Table 4
Coverage Under Employer-Financed Pension or Retirement Plan, Full-Time Private
Wage and Salary Workers Aged 16 or Older, 1972, 1979, 1983, and 1988
Coverage Status
Percent of Total
1972      1979      1983      1988
Covered by employer-financed plan
Basic pension only
Both pension and pretax plans
Pretax savings plan only
Not covered
Don’t know
48        50        48        46
33
......
47 43 49 52
4 7 3 2
Addendum:
Number (in thousands) 48,000 59,735 59,938 71,485
Source: John R. Woods, "Pension Coverage Among Private Wage and Salary
Workers: Preliminary Findings From 1988 Survey of Employee Benefits," Social
Security Bulletin, October 1989, p. 17.
13unionized, which are key determinants of pension coverage, has suffered a
permanent decline. While employment and pension coverage in the service-
producing industries expanded between 1979 and 1983, the gains in this sector
have not offset the declines in manufacturing. The inevitable conclusion is
that because of the influence of industry structure on pension coverage,
thepercentage of the work force covered by supplementary plans in the United
States will not increase noticeably in the foreseeable future.
Efforts to broaden pension coverage through individual voluntary
arrangements have not been successful. In an attempt to offer retirement
income opportunities to more individuals, ERISA authorized the individual
retirement account (IRA). ~Although eligibility was limited initially to those
without pensions, it was expanded in 1981 to encompass all workers, including
those currently covered by pension plans. It soon became evident, however,
that while IRAs were offered to all, they were being used primarily by higher-
income people,-many of whom already had pension coverage.3 As a result of
this pattern of usage, Congress substantially tightened IRA provisions in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Specifically, contributions to IRAs were fulTy tax
deferred only for persons who were not active participants in an employer-
sponsored pension plan or whose adjusted gross income fell below certain
phaseout levels ($25,000 for an individual and $40,000 for a married couple).
Persons not eligible for tax-deferred treatment on the contribution could make
taxable contributions to an IRA and still enjoy tax-deferred earnings.
The 1988 CPS revealed that 12 percent of wage and salary workers
contributed to an IRA. The interesting fact, however, is that workers covered
3Data showed that 58 percent of individuals earning over $50,000
contributed to an IRA in 1982 compared to only 17 percent of people earning
between $15,000 and $20,000 (EBRI 1984).
14by an employer-sponsored pension plan reported higher IRA contribution rates
than did noncovered workers. Moreover, those who had both basic pension
coverage and a tax-deferred plan reported slightly higher IRA contribution
rates than those covered by only one type of pension. This pattern meant that
only an additional 10 percent of wage and salary workers picked up coverage
through IRAs, leaving nearly half with no pension provisions at all.
Thus, the lack of universal coverage for supplementary retirement
benefits remains an unsolved problem. This inevitably creates a tension,
because, as discussed earlier, the tax concessions for private plans represent
a significant revenue loss to the Treasury. With the current structure, less
than half the work force is covered by a pension plan, yet all taxpayers must
pay higher taxes to make up for these forgone revenues. With such an
inequitable distribution of tax concessions, proposals constantly surface for
either restricting the favorable tax provisions for private plans or making
coverage universal so that all workers can enjoy the advantages of deferral.
Unfortunately, no one has suggested a workable way of resolving the coverage
dilemma within our current institutional framework.
The next section focuses on another difficult problem--namely, the loss
in the value of earned pension credits suffered by the mobile employee under
defined benefit plans.
IV. The Erosion in the Value of Vested Pension Credits after Termination
Despite recent growth in defined contribution plans, the majority of
those covered by basic pension plans still participate in defined benefit
plans. For workers who remain with one employer throughout their work lives,
defined benefit plans have the advantage of offering a predictable benefit,
15usually expressed as a percent of final pay for each year of service. A
problem arises, however, in the case of mobile employees, and this would arise
even if all firms had identical plans and immediate vesting; mobile employees
receive significantly lower benefits as a result of changing jobs than they
would have received from continuous coverage under a single plan. This
difference arises because final earnings levels determine pension benefits.
The worker who remains with a plan receives benefits related to earnings just
before retirement, but the benefits for mobile employees are based on earnings
at the time they terminate employment.
The more wages rise with productivity and inflation, the relatively lower
the benefits received by the mobile employee. A simple example indicates
that, if wages increased 4 percent annually, the pension of a worker who held
four jobs would equal 61 percent of the pension of a worker who remained
continuously employed by one firm. If.wage growth were 8 percent, the
relative position of the mobile employee would deteriorate further (Table 5).
Thus, the higher the rate of inflation and the greater the productivity
growth, the more discontinuous employment reduces the real value of benefits.
This erosion occurs because plan sponsors do not calculate benefits at
termination on the basis of projected salary, nor, alternatively, do they
index benefits to the rate of wage growth for the period between termination
of employment and retirement. The problem could be soTved very easily, in a
mechanical sense, by having each employer provide the terminating employee a
lump sum that reflected the value of benefits based on projected earnings at
age 65 rather than earnings at the time of termination. This enhanced amount
could then be invested in an IRA and the mobile employee would suffer no loss
in benefits. Hence, the problem is not a technical one.
16Table 5








Inflation Rate: 0 Percent
Four-job workera
Job I $ 10,000 10% $ 1,000
Job 2 10,000 10 1,000
Job 3 10,000 10 1,000
Job 4 10,000 10 1,000
Total 40 4,000
One-job worker 10,000 40 4,000
Inflation Rate: 6 Percent
Four-job workera
Job 1 17,908 10 1,790
Job 2 32,071 10 3,207
Job 3 57,435 10 5,744
Job 4 102,857 10 10,286
Total 40 21,027
One-job worker 102,857 40 41,143
Inflation Rate: 8 Percent
Four-job worker~
Job 1 21,589 10 2,159
Jpb 2 46,609 10 4,661
Job 3 100,626 10 10,063
Job 4 217,243 10 21,724
Total 40 38,607
One-job worker 217,243 40 86,897
Inflation Rate: 10 Percent
Four-job workera
Job 1 25,937 10 2,594
Job 2 67,275 10 6,728
Job 3 174,494 10 17,449
Job 4 452,593 10 45,259
Total 40 72,030





aAssumes a consistent increase in wages to compensate for inflation, and no growth in
wages due to productivity.
bBase salary is $i0,000 and benefit is calculated on earnings in last year of employment.
CAssumes annual benefit accrual of 1 percent a year.
dAssumes worker stays at each job for I0 years.
Source: Alicia H. Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, 1982, Table 7-2, p. 176.
17Instead, the difficulty is one of cost. Employers are willing to keep
their benefits up-to-date with wages, by basing benefits on final salary, for
people who remain covered by their plan until retirement, but they resist
doing so for terminated employees. Increasing benefits for terminated
employees will increase employer cost and mean either lower benefits for
remaining employees or lower wages for all employees. Furthermore, by
providing lower benefits to mobile employees, the firm can reduce turnover
andretain skilled workers, which, after all, was one of the motivations for
establishing pension plans in the first place.
Moreover, this problem cannot be solved simply by improving
"portability." Literally, portability means nothing more than the ability of
an employee to transfer the present monetary value of vested pension credits
to a succeeding plan or central clearinghouse upon termination of employment.
The key issue is the amount of money transferred. The transferring of vested
pension credits where benefits are based on salary at termination does not
prevent the erosion of the value of benefits. Such an arrangement would be
advantageous only if the market interest rates systematically exceeded the
interest rate used by the actuary to determine the discounted value of future
benefits.
In short, employees covered by defined benefit plans will probably
continue to receive pension credits based on their salary at the time they
terminate employment with a firm, rather than on salary projected at
retirement. These benefits, frozen in nominal terms, will erode in value in
the face of persistent inflation and wage growth. This phenomenon, for which
no easy solution exists, makes the future level of retirement income highly
uncertain for the mobile employee.
18The next section addresses the indexing question, where a feasible
financial innovation may be available.
V. The Erosion of Benefits after Retirement
Supplementary pension plans generally do not provide post-retirement
cost-of-living adjustments. Consequently, even moderate rates of inflation
will erode the purchasing power of benefits fixed in nominal terms, noticeably
lowering retirees’ standards of living. When persistent inflation is combined
with the trend toward earlier retirement, the value of unindexed pension
benefits declines significantly.
Employers and plan sponsors have been aware of the erosive impact of
inflation and have attempted to adjust benefits in response to rising prices.
For the majority of beneficiaries who are covered by defined benefit plans,
these adjustments have taken the form of ad hoc increases in pension benefits.
The problem is that such adjustments tend to offset no more than one-third of
inflation’s erosive impact. Furthermore, almost no sponsors guarantee
cost-of-living adjustments and those that do, primarily plans sponsored by
state and local governments, have annual caps of 2 or 3 percent.
Consequently, even beneficiaries who do receive annual adjustments experience
a considerable reduction in the purchasing power of their benefits.
In the major defined contribution plan, Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association (TIAA) and College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), the response
to inflation has been to design annuities that pattern benefits to reflect
expected inflation. For example, TIAA offers a graded benefit payment, under
which benefits are significantly lower to start but then increase each year in
relation to the amount by which actual investment experience exceeds the
19interest rate. CREF offers a variable annuity under which benefits are
adjusted each year to reflect the performance of the fund’s stock portfolio.
Stocks, however, have been so volatile that some retirees have suffered
serious declines in both the real and nominal values of their retirement
benefits. A difficult thing to remember in a period when the Dow hits a new
high every day.
One possible reason for the lack of automatic cost-of-living adjustments
for private pension benefits is that no financial asset exists that could
serve as the basis for a fully indexed annuity. Common stocks, which have for
a long time been thought to be an inflationary hedge, have been shown to be a
particularly unsuitable investment for producing a stable retirement income.
While over the past 30 years stocks have provided a high average return,
investors have experienced significant periods of negative real earnings.
Long-term bonds have fared much less well: their average real return has been
near zero and in recent years the variability has been almost as great as that
for common stocks. Treasury bills do offer a stable positive real return, but
it is very low, and these instruments are still not a perfect hedge against
inflation.
What pension sponsors need is a financial instrument whose real yield is
unaffected by inflation and whose return reflects a full inflation premium.
Index bonds, which have long been advocated by economists from both ends of
the political spectrum and which in 1981 were launched quite successfully in
Great Britain, are just such instruments.~ Unlike conventional bonds, which
are issued at a nominal interest rate and which subject holders to capital
4See Munnell and Grolnic (1986) for a description of index bonds, an
examination of the British experience, and a discussion of the application of
index bonds to the U.S. situation.
2Ogains or losses if the underlying inflation assumption proves incorrect, index
bonds are designed to fully protect investors against the deterioration of
principal and interest due to inflation.
Index bonds are the perfect instrument to enable pension plan sponsors to
provide inflation-adjusted annuities. These bonds could be issued exclusively
to pension plans, thus circumventing some tax issues, and in relatively small
amounts, so that they do not disrupt financial markets. Careful analysis
indicates that they should not have any adverse effect on Treasury revenues.
Index bonds would significantly enhance the current array of financial options
and improve the predictability of pension benefits at no additional cost to
the government or the taxpayer. Without such an instrument, automatic cost-
of-living adjustments are unrealistic, since they would impose more real costs
on plan sponsors than they would have incurred in a noninflationary
environment.
VI. Conclusion
During the 1980s, considerable progress was made towards improving the
equity and effectiveness of private pension plans: integration provisions were
revised, vesting requirements were lowered, and limits were reduced on amounts
eligible for preferred tax treatment under both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans. At the same time, ERISA funding provisions and the runup
of the stock market resulted in plans being more fully funded. The funding,
vesting, and integration developments all increased the chance that someone
covered by a pension plan would actually end up receiving a benefit in
retirement. The reduction in the contribution and benefit limits for
individuals also helped ensure that the benefits of the favorable tax
provisions were focused on the middle class rather than the very rich. (Not
21all developments were desirable during the 1980s, however; the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act inappropriately limited employers’ tax-deductible funding
contributions to qualified defined benefit plans.)
Despite these positive developments, coverage continues to decline. This
means that less than half of the population gains from the tax-preferred
treatment of pensions, yet all taxpayers must make up for the revenue loss by
facing higher tax rates. It seems increasingly difficult to justify the
generous subsidy as the proportion of the population covered by pensions
falls.
Dismantling the pension system is not a desirable or feasible goal,
however; pensions provide supplemental income to millions of retired persons.
Moreover, the trend from defined benefit to defined contribution plans will
help address the problem of the erosion of vested terminated benefits, and the
introduction of index bonds could allow plan sponsors to adjust benefits for
inflation after retirement. In short, those who are covered by pensions could
end up getting more substantial and reliable benefits than they have in the
past.
Whereas the case for employer-sponsored pensions as an institution is
strong, the case for a major tax expenditure is weak. The simplest way to
recoup the subsidy without interfering with the institution is to levy an
annual tax on pension reserves. A rate of 2.5 percent would recover the
entire tax expenditure; a lower rate would recover a portion. Many other
approaches to taxing employer-sponsored pensions are also feasible. The
important point is that, given the other demands on the budget, eliminating a
tax expenditure that benefits a declining and privileged proportion of the
population should be given serious consideration.
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